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Reviews & Replies

On “Military Anthropology”
Anna Simons
This commentary addresses Montgomery McFate’s book Military Anthropology:
Soldiers, Scholars and Subjects at the Margins of Empire, published by Oxford
University Press (2018).

I

t may seem unfair to use Montgomery McFate’s Military Anthropology
to launch into a critical commentary about the utility of anthropology
for the US military. But her book places her in the position of
attempting to define a subfield—military anthropology—while trying to
sell anthropology to the Department of Defense as well. Unfortunately,
in the process she gets too much wrong and not enough right.
Without question, those of us who are McFate’s peers—other
anthropologists who have worked with and for the military—would
adamantly agree: anthropological sensibilities are vitally important when
it comes to fashioning a more astute foreign policy in the twenty-first
century, and are essential for at least some decision makers in uniform
to have. But anthropology has never been a “discipline perpetually
joined to the military execution of foreign policy,” despite what
McFate claims (335).
Nor is it fair or historically accurate to accuse anthropology of having
been colonialism’s handmaiden. This charge has become a favorite
of progressive revisionists and is one McFate enjoys turning to her
advantage. But the truth is, more anthropologists actually argued with
authorities on behalf of the people they studied than abetted officials
in oppressing or even governing them. Thus when McFate promotes
the idea anthropology can—and even should—be reweaponized to
serve the Department of Defense today, she treads on shaky ground.
Worse, of course, is to want any academic discipline to be weaponized
to do anything. The point of academe is to investigate, analyze, report,
question, and even interrogate carefully what passes for conventional
wisdom. Insights can certainly be used—otherwise, what is the point?
But no discipline should be harnessed to a political endeavor of any type.
More troubling than McFate’s sins of commission, however,
may be her sins of omission. Take the 10 very interesting individuals
she profiles in her book. In order of appearance they are: Gerald
Hickey, who worked among US military advisers in Vietnam during
the 1960s; Robert Rattray, employed by the British colonial office in
West Africa; Ursula Bower, who led Naga tribesmen in northeastern
India during World War II; Gregory Bateson, who briefly worked for
the Office of Strategic Services during World War II; Tom Harrisson,
who helped lead tribesmen in Borneo during World War II; John Useem,
who served in Palau in the wake of World War II; Jomo Kenyatta
and Louis Leakey, who operated on opposite sides of the Mau Mau
insurgency in Kenya during the 1950s; Don Marshall, who participated
in the Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development
of Vietnam study begun in 1964; and lastly, David Barrows, who
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was the assistant chief of staff G2 of the American expeditionary force
sent to Siberia on the heels of the Bolshevik revolution.
Oddly, by showcasing these 10, McFate reveals a degree of
ethnocentricity one hopes none of them would indulge in were they
practicing anthropology today. I say this because the idea that it takes
Westerners to explain foreign locals to other Westerners is hopelessly
outdated. Yet this idea seems to be McFate’s subtheme (minus her
inclusion of Kenyatta).
Equally peculiar is that several of McFate’s anthropologists weren’t
even anthropologists. As she tells us in her introduction, “Each chapter
uses the life and times of an anthropologist who worked directly with
the military” (10). Yet, at least one (John Useem) was an American
sociologist not an anthropologist, while two (Ursula Bower and Tom
Harrisson) lacked any formal anthropological training prior to their
service with British authorities. Meanwhile, several individuals McFate
profiles never worked directly for the military. So one has to wonder,
what is McFate up to when she treats these 10 as paragons?
As McFate explains in her introduction, Military Anthropolog y
originated as a professional military education project; the idea was
every chapter could be used as a standalone lesson. Unfortunately this
means McFate has saddled each of her anthropologists with helping
her prove some broader point—about courage under fire, indirect rule,
military leadership, information operations, unconventional warfare,
governance operations, the counterinsurgency system, the strategic
objective, and military execution.
In several cases her pairings work well. In other chapters, she
overwhelms readers with too much extraneous or only partial information.
To her credit, McFate can be a vivid writer, and her focus on strange rites
and practices will likely appeal to nonanthropologists who will not be
upset that she overfetishizes the exotic (a considerable anthropological
sin), though why she then thinks any but the most committed graduate
students will be interested in the details of recondite anthropological
debates remains a mystery.
The real issue with Military Anthropolog y, however, is McFate bills it
as, “a history, insofar as it explores certain key episodes in the history of
military anthropology” (10). Yet her sequence is not chronological and
she never relates key episodes. She does not because she cannot. Military
anthropology did not exist between 1918 and 1970 when the individuals
she profiles were in the field. It still does not exist. Unlike psychology
with military psychology, sociology with military sociology, and history
with military history, anthropology has never had a recognized military
subfield. Indeed, when several of us tried to kick-start such a thing several
decades ago, it was the controversy over the US Army’s Human Terrain
System, a program McFate conceived and helped run, that nipped our
efforts in the bud.
As McFate notes, anthropology has not always been skeptical of or
hostile to the military. Animus dates from the 1960s and is as much a
relic of Baby Boomers’ reaction to Vietnam as to a handful of projects
some anthropologists assisted with in Indochina and Latin America.
This enmity is why the prospect of our gaining acceptance remained
touch-and-go even as several of us who were studying militaries both

Reviews & Replies 123
here and abroad tried to affect a thaw in the late 1990s. Unfortunately
with the Human Terrain System’s revival of anthropologists’ suspicions
of the military, back into the deep freeze we went. One consequence
has been that since 9/11 the military has too often deferred to
pseudoanthropologists who purport to have insight into other cultures.
The other consequence has been anthropology’s still too primitive view
of soldiers and soldiering.
As for who can be considered a bona fide military anthropologist
today, there are still (maybe) only a dozen academic anthropologists
worldwide who have pursued firsthand studies of military units. In
contrast, many more anthropologists and archeologists have engaged
in applied work, either directly for the military (through the Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the like) or indirectly via think
tanks, such as RAND.
Others, when willing, have been consulted by the military as
regional experts, forensic experts, and other specialists. A fourth small
category of anthropologists are those who teach courses in professional
military education institutions and elsewhere, and who learn about the
military’s own service cultures in the process. And a rising fifth category
is comprised of veterans now earning their PhDs. But, does this make
all of us military anthropologists?
In some regards the differences among us might seem, well,
academic—akin to those between armor, aviation, intelligence,
and finance. Still, my hunch is that most of us would agree McFate’s
conception of what we do does not reflect what we are doing or can do.
I say this because if McFate had her way, our chief role would be to
provide the military with useful insights, better information, and greater
understanding so that it can better proceed with whatever it seeks to
undertake. It is apparently not our place or our job to raise questions
about the wisdom of doctrine or policy, or even to wonder whether
it makes sense in the twenty-first century for one set of Americans to
advise another set of Americans about what they should (or should not)
be doing in someone else’s country.
Yet most of us, I would like to think, recognize the days are long past
when there are no educated natives who could explain native behavior or
effectively relay local grievances, resentments, or concerns to interlopers,
especially since most populations today have at least some members
who can better explain what is going on locally than all but the most
gifted outsiders can. After all, from whom do the best anthropologists,
journalists, and other regional experts get their information? From wellinformed locals, of course.
In 2020, the Department of Defense should not just be acting as
though it wants to take knowledgeable locals seriously, but, given
twenty-first-century sensibilities, the Department of Defense should be
taking them more seriously. Or from a slightly different angle, consider
Afghanistan and Iraq. There are Afghans and Iraqis with graduate
anthropology degrees. In fact, Afghanistan’s current president, Dr.
Ashraf Ghani, was once on the anthropology faculty at Johns Hopkins
University. Surely he had as good a sense as anyone about what might
or might not have worked well in terms of US military approaches to
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Afghanistan back in the early 2000s—and doubtless still has views
worth listening to.
In other words, it is past time for Americans to think that only we
can come up with good ideas for others, or formulate more fitting ideas
than they can generate for themselves. At most, we might be able to
help broaden others’ horizons by offering them examples of what has
or has not worked elsewhere, and we excel when it comes to technical
assistance. But now to promote the notion we would better succeed at
occupying other peoples’ countries through a smarter application of
anthropological insights ignores what anthropological insights actually
suggest: doing anything these days without fully vesting others in
determining their own futures dooms us, and not just them.
Something else McFate overlooks is that anthropology has never only
been about better understanding others. Its dual purpose has always been
to help us better see ourselves. When done well, anthropology forces us
to take a good hard look at our own contradictions and inconsistences.
And certainly, an institution as large and complex as the military is rife
with both, which makes it ideal terrain for anthropologists. Especially
when you consider a second reality anthropologists routinely tackle.
No matter how often we Americans are enjoined to speak truth
to power, no one in a hierarchy is ever apt to speak truth to power.
But well-trained anthropologists will. Indeed, questioning truth and
power have long been anthropologists’ forte. So is taking an inside-out,
bottom-up approach. Anthropologists are not just prone to question
everything we see and hear but are primed to treat nothing as sacred,
including doctrine, strategy, customs, organizational constructs, or
what have you. Consequently, no one is better positioned than we are
to raise critical questions about best and worst practices before offering
objective analysis.
Although our role of perpetually asking why is one McFate would
apparently prefer we not engage in, a number of us who have worked
in and around the military have been doing our best to shake military
sensibilities constructively in myriad ways for years (particularly in
professional military education). But because we are a small scattered
band and have acted as quiet professionals, no one yet has captured all
of our endeavors. Even so, and just given the contributions of which I
am already aware, numerous misconceptions will be overturned when
military anthropology’s history is finally written. Among the premises to
be overturned will be most of those feted in Military Anthropolog y.
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The Author Replies
Montgomery McFate

U

nfortunately, Anna Simons mischaracterizes the arguments in
Military Anthropology without actually discussing the substance
of the book. Simons seems to believe my book is a marketing
pitch for anthropology. However, I am certainly not trying to “sell
anthropology to the Department of Defense,” nor am I promoting the
idea that “anthropology can—and even should—be reweaponized to
serve the Department of Defense today.” In fact, I state quite clearly the
purpose of this book is to understand how military organizations have
used sociocultural knowledge at the strategic, operational, and tactical
level in a variety of different conflicts, and how individual anthropologists
contributed their knowledge about the human condition to difficult
national security problems, so that if sociocultural knowledge plays an
important role in future conflict, some of the pitfalls of the past might
be avoided.
If anything, my book is quite skeptical about the use of anthropology
by the military since so much anthropological advice has been misused
or gone unheeded. In the introduction, for example, I discuss how
Gerald Hickey provided advice to the US Army in Vietnam, advocating
for a viable ceasefire in accord with Vietnamese concepts of conflict
resolution, arguing against forced relocation of Vietnamese peasants
and Montagnard tribes to strategic hamlets, and so on. As I note,
Hickey’s “predictions proved disturbingly accurate in retrospect, most
of Hickey’s recommendations went unheeded” (3).
In Simons’ view, anthropologists should “investigate, analyze,
report, question, and even interrogate what passes for conventional
wisdom.” I agree wholeheartedly with her view. Thus the vast majority
of case studies in the book detail the way in which anthropologists
argued with authorities on behalf of the people they studied, sometimes
while governing them. For example, the chapter on Robert Rattray
details his efforts while employed as a government anthropologist in the
Gold Coast (now Ghana) to convince the government to recognize the
queen mothers officially, preserve African institutions, and to counter
the biased, erroneous stereotypes in the minds of the administration
through empirical research.
Simons takes issue with the idea of military anthropology on the
grounds it is not a recognized subfield in the discipline of anthropology.
Given the historic hostility of anthropologists to the military (and the
government in general), it is hardly surprising anthropology does not
include military anthropology as a recognized subfield. But as my book
demonstrates, the history of anthropology and the military is a long and
interesting one.
For example, the concluding chapter concerns the experience of a
young Army lieutenant colonel named David Barrows, who struggled to
understand the politics of intervention in the 1918 American intervention
in Siberia. Later in his life, Barrows became the only US Army general to
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have a PhD in anthropology. When I was a student at the University of
California, Berkeley, I took classes in Barrows Hall, but I did not know
who he was. His remarkable books and incredible life experiences are
completely forgotten by anthropologists. Just because anthropologists
do not recognize their own intellectual legacy does not justify its absence
from history.
Simons seems very concerned about the membership of a club she
does not believe should exist. She notes John Useem was a sociologist
and Ursula Bower and Tom Harrisson lacked formal training. Just to
address one example, Tom Harrisson lacked a PhD in anthropology.
However, Harrisson did exactly what anthropologists do, and he did
it with great panache. To employ Simons’ words, he investigated,
analyzed, reported, questioned, and even interrogated “what passes for
conventional wisdom.”
For example, before he served with the Office of Strategic
Services in World War II, Harrisson conducted research on the island
of Malekula in the New Hebrides and lived among people who still
practiced ritual cannibalism. In his book about the experience living
among cannibals, Savage Civilisation (1937), Harrisson challenged the
conventional progressive liberalism of 1930s British foreign policy,
arguing the Malekulans did not need Western democracy, religion, or
customs because they were “in many ways as, and in some ways more,
civilized than the Europeans in the same part of the world.” Professor
Simons’ complaints about whether these historical figures count as
anthropologists raises the question: is anthropology defined by what one
does, or is it defined by an official stamp on university letterhead?
Simons characterizes my book as “promot[ing] the notion we would
better succeed at occupying other peoples’ countries through a smarter
application of anthropological insights.” Undoubtedly, as I have argued
elsewhere, had the US military and policy community better understood
the culture, history, politics, and economics of Iraq and Afghanistan,
less blood and treasure would have been lost. But the actual argument
of my book is military intervention always interferes with the local
society; strategic objectives must take social conditions into account;
problem framing determines problem solution; and the instrumentalism
of national security often negates the objective. Because these problems
arise consistently during the military execution of foreign policy (as
demonstrated by the case studies in my book), intervention should not
be the option of first resort.
No book is perfect, and I am certainly aware of the flaws in
Military Anthropolog y. I could have perhaps chosen more illustrative
cases, or included more recent material from Iraq or Afghanistan, or
perhaps ensured the conclusions better followed from the premises.
However, Simon’s criticisms do not appear to concern the actual book
I wrote, Military Anthropolog y, but rather her own notions of the role of
anthropologists vis-à-vis the military. In using me as an example of a
naughty anthropologist who uncritically assists the military in achieving
its foreign policy objectives, she casts herself as a critical voice in the
military establishment who speaks truth to power. Actually, one can
do both: I have spent most of my career questioning the conventional
military wisdom and then doing something about it.

